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In this paper we connect the events of the last twelve months, "The Panic of 2008" as it has been called,
to the demand for international reserves. In previous work, we have shown that international reserve
demand can be rationalized by a central bank’s desire to backstop the broad money supply to avert
the possibility of an internal/external double drain (a bank run combined with capital flight). Thus,
simply looking at trade or short-term debt as motivations for reserve holdings is insufficient; one must
also consider the size of the banking system (M2). Here, we show that a country’s reserve holdings
just before the current crisis, relative to their predicted holdings based on these financial motives, can
significantly predict exchange rate movements of both emerging and advanced countries in 2008. Countries
with large war chests did not depreciate -- and some appreciated. Meanwhile, those who held insufficient
reserves based on our metric were likely to depreciate. Current account balances and short-term debt
levels are not statistically significant predictors of depreciation once reserve levels are taken into account.
Our model’s typically high predicted reserve levels provide important context for the unprecedented
U.S. dollar swap lines recently provided to many countries by the Federal Reserve.
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For nearly two decades, the group of emerging-market countries increased its holdings of 
liquid foreign exchange reserves, both in dollar terms and relative to domestic income 
levels.  That  trend  accelerated  in  the  early  2000s,  but  it  may  be  ending  now  as  the 
emerging economies struggle in the backwash of the global financial crisis and economic 
slowdown. In the mid-2000s, liquidity was abundant in the world economy, but recently 
there has been an acute global shortage of dollar liquidity. Recent declines in emerging 
market international reserves are directly related to this shortage.  
Figure 1 illustrates reserve developments for three large emerging economies, the 
Russian Federation, India, and Korea. All three countries’ reserve levels peaked and then 
began to decline in the summer of 2008. In particular, Russia’s huge reserve holdings—
second in dollar terms only to those of China and Japan—have plummeted by about a 
quarter since reaching their oil-driven peak in July 2008.
1 There are many other examples 
beyond the three especially dramatic ones in Figure 1; often, however, the percentage 
reserve losses are smaller (so far) and start later (for example, after the September 2008 
Lehman  Brothers  collapse).  The  Russian,  Indian,  and  Korean  currencies  have  all 
depreciated against the United States dollar since the summer of 2008, with Korea’s won 
declining most dramatically to levels not seen since the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. 
Before  the  recent  crisis,  commentary  on  the  emerging-market  reserve  buildup 
focused  on  the  possibility  that  reserve  stocks  might  have  reached  “excessive”  levels. 
Certainly  some  countries’  reserve  levels  far  exceeded  the  levels  needed  to  counter 
fluctuations in export earnings, and often even covered the possibility that short-term 
                                                 
1  The  Russian  situation  was  exacerbated  by  noneconomic  fundamentals  (political  risk),  most  notably 
following the invasion of Georgia in August 2008. The Russian data are also obfuscated by occasional 
replenishments of the central bank’s reserves by drawing from the country’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. The 
fungibility  of  central  bank  and  SWF  assets,  and  the  rapidly  growing  size  of  SWF  hoards,  will  likely 
complicate measurement even further in future.   2 
external debts might not be rolled over (the so-called “Guidotti-Greenspan” prescription 
for reserve adequacy). Economic analysis of optimal reserve levels has a long history, 
going back at least to the writing of Henry Thornton (1939) at the start of the nineteenth 
century. In recent work, we have followed Thornton’s lead, arguing that governments—
especially  those  of  emerging  markets—view  reserves  as  protection  against  “double-
drain” crisis scenarios in which banking and currency problems interact in ways likely to 
cause sharp and disruptive external currency depreciation.
2  
In a specific crisis scenario, investor fear of currency depreciation leads to a run 
out of domestic deposits, pressuring banks and triggering lender-of-last resort liquidity 
(LLR) provision by the monetary authorities. This LLR support, however, magnifies the 
potential claims on official foreign exchange reserves, and hence magnifies the currency 
depreciation that results when the reserves are expended to support the exchange rate. It 
follows that reserve levels may have to be quite large if the banking system is highly 
developed and the government hopes to resist sharp currency depreciation in a potential 
crisis. Official fear of abrupt depreciation may be due to dollarized financial liabilities, 
rapid  pass-through  to  inflation,  or  other  factors  discussed  in  the  “fear  of  floating” 
literature. 
The utility of foreign exchange reserves is well articulated by the International 
Monetary Fund (2008, p. 37) in a recent overview of the current crisis: “[I]n the face of 
sharp capital outflows, countries will need to respond quickly to ensure adequate liquidity 
and deal with emerging problems in weaker institutions. The exchange rate should be 
                                                 
2 See Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor (2008). Similar theoretical ideas have been 
discussed in the crisis literature, for example by Guillermo A. Calvo (1996, 2006), Calvo and Enrique G. 
Mendoza (1996), Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco (2001), Jeffrey D. Sachs (1998), and Velasco (1987). 
Jeanne (2007) surveys recent commentary and analysis regarding emerging-market reserves.   3 
allowed  to  absorb  some  of  the  pressure,  but  stockpiles  of  reserves  provide  room  for 
intervention to avoid disorderly market conditions.” 
I. Financial Stability and Reserves in the Data 
In Obstfeld et al. (2008) we argue that a considerable share of the reserve accumulation in 
recent years can be explained as an attempt by central banks to insure against this sort of 
financial instability. Importantly, the financial shock we consider is not simply a “sudden 
stop”, in which case countries would need to hold reserves only in proportion to their 
short  term  external  debt.  Rather,  internal  sources  of  financial  instability  also  can  be 
critical. As a result, when a country has open financial markets and desires exchange rate 
stability, it needs to hold reserves proportional to the size of its banking system. 
Specifically,  we  show  that  the  reserves/GDP  ratio  is  a  function  of  financial 
openness, the exchange rate regime and monetary depth (M2/GDP ratio). Despite the 
focus on the “Guidotti-Greenspan” rule and sudden stops in the literature, short term 
external debt is not a significant predictor of reserve holdings, though another variable 
often  considered  in  more  traditional  models,  the  Trade/GDP  ratio  is.
3  Thus,  a 
specification  like  that  in  Table  1,  Column  1,  which  combines  our  basic  “financial 
stability” variables with Trade/GDP does a good job of explaining reserve behavior.
4 We 
                                                 
3 For a review of the recent empirical literature, see Obstfeld et al (2008). Robert Flood and Nancy Marion 
(2002) have connected reserve holdings to a buffer stock model, Joshua Aizenman and Marion (2003) have 
argued the buildup of reserves in East Asia can be seen as precautionary savings, and Aizenman and 
Jaewoo Lee (2007) argue that precautionary not mercantilist reasons can explain the reserves buildup. 
Relative to these papers, we focus more on the size of the domestic financial system as opposed to fear of 
sudden stops. 
4 The model is estimated in natural logs and standard errors are clustered at the country level to correct for 
both  heteroskedasticity  across  countries  and  serial  correlation  within  countries.  We  use  WDI  data  for 
reserves,  GDP,  and  M2.  The  Financial  openness  measure  is  from  Edwards  (2007),  the  exchange  rate 
classification is based on Shambaugh (2004), and the measure of “original sin” is from Barry Eichengreen 
et al. (2005) and is based on BIS issuance data. See Obstfeld et al. (2008) for details on data and sample.    4 
see  that  the  coefficients  on  financial  openness,  monetary  depth,  and  trade  all  have 
expected signs and are significantly different from zero at 99%. A “soft peg” measure is 
also positive and significant at 99% while a direct peg is not (though the two are not 
statistically significantly different). The regressions are in logs, so a 10% increase in the 
M2/GDP ratio is correlated with a 3% increase in the reserves to GDP ratio. Financial 
openness  is  scaled  between  0  and  1  (based  on  the  measure  proposed  by  Sebastian 
Edwards 2007) and the exchange-rate regime variables are dummies. 
In the Emerging Market sample (EM), where much of the puzzle over recent 
behavior  lies,  a  specification  like  this  explains  a  substantial  portion  of  reserve/GDP 
variation, both over time for one country (in panel estimations with country fixed effects) 
and across countries (in cross-sections or in panels with year fixed effects). Column 2 
shows  the  basic  EM  sample  regression.  The  coefficients  on  financial  openness  and 
monetary depth are even larger, as is the explanatory power of the regression. The R
2 is 
now as high as 0.6. Differences in exchange rate regimes are not significant in the EM-
only sample.
5  
Financial depth is even more important in the last 15 years since the expansion of 
financial globalization. In Column 3 we show the specification for 1993-2005 for all 
countries.
6 Here the coefficient on financial depth has increased such that a 10% increase 
in  M2/GDP  comes  with  a  5%  increase  in  reserves/GDP.  The  coefficient  on  trade 
                                                 
5 As we note in our previous work, many of the emerging market countries flip back and forth across 
exchange rate regimes and even when not pegging may intend to peg soon. See Michael W. Klein and 
Shambaugh (2008). 
6 As noted below, we will also include a measure of the ability to issue debt externally in local currency. 
This measure is not available until 1993, so we limit ourselves to that sample here. In Obstfeld et al. (2008) 
we show that a post 1990 sample that is not limited by “sin” data availability also looks like the regression 
shown here.   5 
openness has declined some. Financial openness is less significant in this sample. There 
is less variation within country in this shorter sample so some precision is lost. 
One  other  factor  that  is  consistently  significant  is  a  dummy  for  the  advanced 
countries (AD). These countries hold fewer reserves than their M2/GDP, Trade/GDP, 
exchange rate regime and financial openness suggest they should. This is true even when 
we control for the ability to issue debt in ones’ own currency, or “original sin.” Column 4 
shows this regression. The sin variable—which varies from 0 (little foreign currency debt 
issued) to 1 (all external debt is in foreign currency, none local) has a significant and 
positive coefficient. Going from all local currency debt to all foreign currency debt would 
double reserve holdings.
7 
In this paper, rather than focusing entirely on the EM sample (as in our previous 
work) we now include AD countries. While the puzzle of reserve buildup was primarily 
an EM issue, the current crisis is one that clearly touches both EM and AD countries. 
Thus, in our predictive work below will be limited to that sample, for which column 5 
shows  the  corresponding  results  for  our  preferred  benchmark  regression  with  only 
financial variables. 
II. Implications for Today 
What can our positive empirical model tell us about reserves, central bank swaps of 
foreign currency, and exchange rates during the recent financial panic? We want to know 
how actual reserve holdings on the eve of the crisis compare to what our model would 
predict, to see if countries were “underinsured” or “overinsured.” Thus, we first generate 
                                                 
7 This variable is largely cross-sectional. There is little variation within countries. Further, there is little 
variation across the EM and developing countries. Nearly all issue almost exclusively foreign currency debt 
externally. There is, however, cross-country variation within the advanced sample.   6 
predicted  values  for  reserve-to-GDP  ratios  in  2005.  We  then  adjust  those  ratios  for 
M2/GDP changes in the last two years to get approximate predicted values for 2007, 
since M2 growth is the main regressor that changes at high frequency in our sample. 
(More details are shown in Appendix Table 1.) 
For  the  year  2007,  EM  countries  were  predicted  to  hold  substantial  reserves; 
predicted ratios are quite high (20% of GDP on average) relative to those of AD countries 
(9%).  Some  have  accumulated  far  beyond  these  levels,  especially  between  2005  and 
2007. By 2007, actual reserves were 26% of GDP on average for these countries.
8 For 
example, in 2005, China’s predicted reserves were 29% of GDP while actual were 37%. 
China held more reserves than expected, but not dramatically so. By 2007, however, 
predicted reserves had not moved much but China’s actual reserves were up to 47% of 
GDP. Likewise Malaysia, Singapore, and Korea were all predicted to have reserves of 
20% of GDP or more, but actual levels were substantially higher. Also, countries like 
Brazil or India who were at or below predicted levels in 2005 were above them by 2007. 
The model predicts the variation across these countries reasonably well. The correlation 
of predicted and actual reserve/GDP ratios is 0.68. 
On the other hand, we can see that many advanced countries held fewer reserves 
than our model predicts.
9 Australia, the U.K., and Canada are notable examples. What if 
we do not think advanced countries should hold fewer reserves than other countries? That 
is, what if we run the regression in column 5 without the AD dummy, we see that the 
predicted values (based on the large financial sectors and tendency towards financial 
                                                 
8 Hong Kong and Singapore are both predicted to and do hold far more reserves than other countries. 
Excluding them, the predicted reserve ratio for the group is 17% of GDP and the actual is 21%. 
9 Due to a lack of individual country reserve holdings or M2, euro area countries are not included in the 
analysis of predicted reserves.   7 
openness) suggest the advanced countries should be holding larger stocks of reserves than 
they actually own. In this exercise we also find that Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand 
are holding fewer reserves than the typical country with their characteristics. Only Japan 
holds substantially more reserves than the predicted value suggests they would.
10 
Perhaps some advanced countries held too few reserves? On the other hand, many 
of these advanced countries received substantial U.S. dollar swap lines from the Federal 
Reserve in 2007 and 2008. Perhaps they knew such types of arrangements would be 
available to them in a pinch, so they did not feel the need to hold reserves in the same 
pattern as EM countries. In that case, estimation with the AD dummy may be the right 
benchmark to examine.
11 
III. Currency Pressure versus the War Chests in The Panic of 2008 
Echoing Thornton, our theoretical model assumes that it is in the event of a panic that 
reserves will be used to quell M2 flight and avert depreciation. It is natural to ask whether 
this mechanism was at work in 2008: were exchange rates better stabilized in countries 
with more reserves relative to M2?—or, to be more faithful to the multivariate model, 
with more reserves relative to what the model would have predicted? 
Figure 2a addresses the first of these questions with a simple scatter of percentage 
depreciation of the currency against the U.S. dollar in the year 2008 [up to 12/15 at time 
                                                 
10 Iceland’s predicted reserves are lower than some other countries because their financial account is coded 
as less open than other advanced countries in the Edwards measure. The Chinn-Ito index also codes Iceland 
as more closed than other advanced nations. 
11 Admittedly, some EM countries (surprisingly) received swap lines from the Fed in 2008. However, the 
size of these lines appears small compared to their hypothetical needs in the event that a run from M2 
should materialize. Skeptics have therefore argued that these lines may be signals at best, or pure window 
dressing. At the time of writing, it is an open question whether they would be expanded, or augmented by 
IMF lines or other funding, should disaster strike.   8 
of writing] versus the country’s reserves/M2 ratio at the end of 2007. The sample is 
restricted  to  just  the  emerging  countries,  as  our  regressions  suggest  that  advanced 
countries  have  an  intrinsically  smaller  need  for  reserves  due  to,  say,  more  policy 
credibility and certainty, or better access to private credit or official swap lines. The 
scatter shows that countries with feebler war chests at the end of 2007 suffered larger 
currency  crashes  in  2008,  offering  preliminary  support  for  our  arguments.  However, 
Table 2, panel (a) explores this relationship further and adds some controls. Column 1 
shows that the bivariate relationship is only borderline significant (p value 0.106). In 
contrast to arguments regarding the perils of financial openness, Column 2 shows that 
currency  values  of  more  financially  open  economies  saw  their  currency  values  more 
likely  to  hold  in  2008,  hinting  at  reverse  causality  from  (more)  financial  stability  to 
(more) openness. Column 3 enters openness and reserves together and the results are 
similar.  Finally,  Column  4  entertains  another  prevalent  explanation,  namely  that 
depreciations  are  really  a  result  of  unsustainable  current  account  deficits.  But  lagged 
current  account  deficit  as  a  share  of  GDP  was  not  a  highly  statistically  significant 
influence in this sample, once we control for the size of the reserve war chest.
12 
Table  2,  panel  (b)  takes  the  next  step  of  using  not  actual  2007  reserves  as  a 
control variable, but the ratio of actual reserves to what our preferred model would have 
predicted. We now see whether “underinsurance” (as judged by our positive model) was 
associated  with  larger  depreciations  in  2008.  Indeed  it  was  in  all  samples  once  we 
exclude  an  influential  extreme  outlier—the  infamous  case  of  Iceland.  In  Columns  2 
                                                 
12 We also experimented in both panels of Table 2 with lagged short term debt to GDP ratio as an extra 
regressor, to address the claim that rollover problems might exacerbate depreciation, but we found its 
coefficient always had the wrong (negative) sign, so that bigger debts appeared to be related to smaller 
depreciations, contradicting the theory.   9 
through 5, which unlike Column 1 exclude Iceland, the relationship between low reserves 
and high depreciation is clear. Actual relative to predicted reserves is significant at the 
1% level in the full and AD samples, and the 10% level in the more noisy EM sample. In 
Column 6 this result is again robust to the inclusion of the lagged current account surplus 
to GDP ratio, which is once more statistically insignificant (though of the expected sign). 
As a convenient graphical summary of our argument, we present a scatter plot of actual 
depreciation in 2008 versus our model’s actual/predicted reserve ratio for the AD & EM 
sample. This is shown in Figure 2b, with Iceland excluded from the line of best fit, as in 
Column  2.  Excluding  the  bizarre  case  of  Iceland,  the  results  are  quite  striking: 
international  reserves  did  provide  effective  insurance  against  currency  instability,  for 
both advanced and emerging countries alike. 
IV. Central Bank Currency Swaps in the Panic of 2008 
This  crisis  has  also  generated  one  of  the  most  notable  examples  of  central  bank 
cooperation in history—the large swap lines set up between a number of central banks.
13 
The Federal Reserve extended large swap lines to industrial-country central banks first 
(ECB,  BoJ,  BoE,  and  SNB)  starting  in  2007;  then  extended  those  to  nearly  every 
advanced economy; and finally, on October 29, 2008, granted similar arrangements to 
four major emerging market countries (Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Singapore).
14 
In these swaps, the Fed has provided dollar liquidity to the other central banks 
allowing these central banks, in turn, to provide dollars to their own domestic banking 
systems. Why are such swap lines needed? Two alternatives for the provision of dollar 
                                                 
13 See Setser (2008) for real-time commentary on the extraordinary nature of the measures. 
14  See  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081029b.htm  and  links  therein  for 
press releases on the swap lines.   10 
liquidity in the foreign country would be (a) for the foreign central bank to provide the 
domestic currency and let the bank sell the local currency for dollars on the open market 
or (b) for the foreign central bank to use its own dollar reserves to provide the liquidity. 
The former would put downward pressure on the local currency and the latter would 
possibly exhaust the central bank’s dollar reserves. Examining current reserve holdings 
relative to our positive model’s predictions is a useful way to provide some empirical 
context for these swap lines. 
The size of the swap lines available has varied across countries and for the major 
industrial-country central banks eventually became unlimited. The ECB and SNB also 
instituted smaller swap lines, in their own currencies, with a number of smaller European 
countries.
15 In Table 3, for swap recipients, we show actual and predicted reserves/GDP 
as well as actual reserves in dollars, the gap in our model between actual to predicted (in 
dollars), and the size of the initial swap lines themselves. 
The swaps were clearly large in magnitude for many advanced countries. For 
every  advanced  country  except  Japan,  the  size  of  the  swap  exceeded  50%  of  actual 
reserves held and in the case of the U.K., Australia, and the ECB, the swap was larger 
than  the  existing  level  of  reserves.
16  In  addition,  for  a  number  of  countries,  such  as 
Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand, not only was the swap line nearly as big as existing 
reserves, but it was larger than the gap with our model’s prediction. On the other hand, in 
some cases, the swap line was too small to plug the gap relative to predicted reserves. 
                                                 
15 See Fender and Gyntelberg (2008) for a discussion of the swap lines. Data for the size of the swaps is 
taken from there. Swaps that were eventually increased to infinity are listed in the table at the largest 
amount prior to that increase and are noted in the table. 
16  Detailed  information  on  reserves  on  the  Bank  of  England  website  shows  currency  composition  of 
reserves and this reveals that the BoE holdings of US dollars was much smaller than the total reserves and 
by the time the swap line was instituted, the BoE was down to less than $10 billion in US dollar reserves.   11 
Australia, Canada and the U.K. all still have fewer reserves than expected even counting 
the swap (and not counting the decline in their reserves in 2008 so far). 
In contrast, the swaps to emerging countries are never larger than 50% of their 
actual  reserves.  Further,  in  most  cases,  the  country  already  had  more  reserves  than 
predicted. Korea’s was $30 billion, though the country already had $260 billion. For 
Singapore  the  figure  was,  $30  billion  against  $162  billion  already  held,  and  Brazil 
received $30 billion versus $180 billion on hand. It is hard to see how these magnitudes 
could be very meaningful; all three countries already held more reserves than predicted 
by our model. Instead, these swap lines could be interpreted as signals. For Mexico and 
Hungary,  the  swaps  are  more  substantial  relative  to  actual  reserves  and  those  two 
countries were holding fewer reserves than predicted, so the swap lines may have had a 
more substantive impact beyond mere signaling in those cases. 
This way of looking at the swaps demonstrates a number of important issues in 
the current international monetary system. Even with nearly a trillion dollars committed, 
in  some  cases  the  Fed’s  action  was  primarily  symbolic  because  the  foreign  country 
already had so many dollars. In other cases, the swap may have been quite important, but 
the scale required to for effective lending is not available to organizations such as the 
IMF or other multilateral agencies. Only the world’s largest central banks can intervene 
on  such  a  scale.  Some  players  (such  as  China  and  India)  do  have  foreign  reserves 
sufficient to allow them to act as crisis lenders to foreign governments, but so far such 
actions have been limited, including Nordic central banks lending euros to Iceland and 
Japan’s offer of $100 billion in resources to the IMF.    12 
The swap lines also have implications for reserve holdings. One could argue that 
the expectation that such swap lines could be available rationalizes advanced countries’ 
decisions to hold fewer reserves than other countries. This would suggest EM countries 
will continue to hold large reserves until they are confident that they will have access to 
substantial  foreign  exchange  swaps  when  in  need.  Alternatively,  these  extraordinary 
measures  may  have  been  just  that—extraordinary.  The  advanced  countries  may  now 
recognize this and increase their reserve stocks (or in some cases adopt the euro to 
reduce the need for reserves). An increase in IMF resources could also be in the cards.  
V. Conclusion 
International reserves are in some ways the ultimate rainy day fund for a country. They 
are hard, liquid assets that have value in times of need. The Panic of 2008 is more than a 
rainy day: it is a torrential downpour. Elsewhere we have argued that reserve holdings are 
strongly connected to the size of the banking system. Countries insure not just against an 
end of foreign financial inflows, but also against runs on the currency by domestic savers. 
Here  we  show  that  interpreting  reserve  holdings  in  this  manner  is  helpful  for 
understanding reserve adequacy and countries’ seemingly different abilities to weather 
the current storm. 
Currencies of countries holding more reserves relative to M2—and in particular, 
more reserves relative to our measure of predicted reserves based on financial motives—
have tended to appreciate in the crisis. Those of countries with smaller war chests have 
depreciated. Understanding these motives for reserve demand also shows that central 
bank swap lines to some smaller advanced countries have been sizable as a share of   13 
current and needed reserves. For most EM countries, though, the swaps have been largely 
symbolic. The scale of reserves needed to backstop emerging markets simply surpasses 
the resources of the multilateral organizations and all but the largest reserves holders in 
the world. 
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Figure 2. Depreciation in 2008 versus Reserves in 2007 
 
(a) Using raw data on reserves/M2, EM sample 
 
 
(b) Using the ratio of actual reserves to predicted, AD & EM sample 
   18 
Table 1—Financial Stability Motives for Holding Reserves 
 
The dependent variable is ln(reserves/GDP). The full sample is all countries, including 
advanced (AD), emerging (EM), and others (developing). The sample consists of annual 
panel data. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 









AD & EM 
Years  1980-2005  1980-2005  1993-2005  1993-2005  1993-2005 
Financial openness  0.524  0.894  0.328  0.364  1.047 
  0.177**  0.183**  0.22  0.218+  0.408* 
Peg  0.127  0.029  0.146  0.109  0.224 
  0.082  0.119  0.096  0.091  0.128+ 
Softpeg  0.167  0.012  0.131  0.082  0.187 
  0.058**  0.111  0.077+  0.064  0.082* 
ln(M2/GDP)  0.322  0.246  0.473  0.52  0.604 
  0.070**  0.118*  0.089**  0.095**  0.118** 
ln(trade/GDP)  0.584  0.567  0.471  0.42  — 
  0.070**  0.075**  0.094**  0.100**   
Advanced  -0.597  0  -0.911  -0.793  -1.098 
  0.126**  0  0.153**  0.172**  0.210** 
Sin  —  —  —  0.995  1.498 
        0.568+  0.586* 
Constant  -6.204  -5.909  -6.095  -7.033  -6.514 
  0.356**  0.425**  0.474**  0.703**  0.932** 
Observations  2911  677  860  860  552 
R-squared  0.37  0.61  0.54  0.56  0.52 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
Column 5 is our preferred model using only financial variables, and is the basis for all results 
below.   19 
Table 2—Depreciation in 2008 versus Reserves in 2007 
 
The dependent variable is percent change in the local currency price of $1 from 12/31/07 
to 12/15/08 (+ = depreciation). All independent variables take their 2007 values. The 
samples include advanced (AD) and/or emerging (EM). 
 
(a) Using raw data on reserves/M2 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Sample  EM  EM  EM  EM 
ln(reserves/M2)  -10.18  —  -10.21+  -9.81+ 
  (6.10)    (5.49)  (5.38) 
Financial openness  —  -37.05**  -37.13**  -31.06* 
    (10.03)  (10.85)  (12.56) 
CA surplus/GDP  —  —  —  -0.32 
        (0.22) 
Constant  4.56  37.09**  26.45**  23.68** 
  (5.38)  (7.37)  (7.69)  (7.52) 
Observations  29  29  29  29 
R-squared  0.10  0.14  0.24  0.29 
 
(b) Using the ratio of actual reserves to predicted 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 












           
Actual/predicted reserves  -2.56  -8.90**  -13.08**  -5.27+  -7.67* 
  (6.64)  (2.42)  (1.22)  (2.76)  (3.01) 
CA surplus/GDP          -0.24 
          (0.25) 
Constant  21.21**  27.17**  32.17**  22.25**  25.72** 
  (7.29)  (4.03)  (5.60)  (5.18)  (4.40) 
Observations  39  38  9  29  38 
R-squared  0.01  0.20  0.56  0.06  0.22 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01.   20 
Table 3—Central Bank Currency Swaps 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
  2007  2007  2007  2007       












Argentina  17.6%  11.4%    $46.14  $16.36     
Brazil  13.7%  13.1%    $180.31  $8.79  $30.00   
China  47.1%  29.0%    $1,546.34  $593.93     
Hungary  17.4%  19.0%    $24.06  -$2.15    € 5.00 
India  23.6%  20.4%    $276.59  $37.22     
Korea, Rep.  27.1%  19.4%    $262.53  $74.65  $30.00   
Mexico  9.8%  11.5%    $87.21  -$15.90  $30.00   
Poland  15.6%  12.7%    $65.72  $12.22    € 10.00 
Russia  36.9%  11.8%    $476.45  $324.51     
Singapore  101.0%  30.4%    $162.91  $113.93  $30.00   
Australia  3.3%  7.1%  11.3%  $26.91  -$65.86  $30.00   
Canada  3.1%  10.5%  11.2%  $41.07  -$107.73  $30.00   
Denmark  11.1%  9.5%  16.4%  $34.32  -$16.28  $15.00  € 15.00 
Iceland  13.5%  4.5%  10.0%  $2.63  $0.68    € 1.50 
Japan  22.2%  5.6%  4.7%  $973.36  $766.33  $120.00   
New Zealand  13.3%  12.3%  18.4%  $17.25  -$6.50  $15.00   
Sweden  7.0%  7.0%  12.5%  $31.03  -$24.36  $30.00   
Switzerland  18.1%  14.0%  20.0%  $75.17  -$8.14  $60.00   
United Kingdom  2.1%  15.6%  21.9%  $57.28  -$540.35  $80.00   
United States  2.0%  2.8%  1.9%  $277.52  $15.87     
ECB  1.8%      $215.56    $240.00   
 
Source: WDI data and authors’ calculations. Gap in reserves uses column 3 for the advanced countries, the 
higher estimate for reserves needs. Swap line amounts from Fender and Gyntelberg (2008). Swap lines in 
italics were eventually uncapped, providing effectively infinite resources if the country chooses to use 
them.   21 
Appendix Table 1—Reserve Holdings in 2007: Predicted versus Actual 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
  2007  2007  2007  2005  2005  2007  2008 




res/gdp  res/gdp 
pred 
actual/pred  dner 
Argentina  17.6%  11.4%    15.4%  11.5%  155%  5.3% 
Brazil  13.7%  13.1%    6.8%  12.6%  105%  21.6% 
Chile  10.3%  14.2%    14.7%  13.9%  72%  26.4% 
China  47.1%  29.0%    37.3%  29.0%  162%  -6.5% 
Colombia  12.2%  11.5%    12.3%  12.4%  106%  16.0% 
Czech Republic  20.8%  18.9%    23.9%  18.3%  110%  7.0% 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  25.1%  30.4%    24.5%  30.8%  83%  1.0% 
Estonia  15.4%  24.0%    14.9%  22.9%  64%  13.4% 
Hong Kong, China  73.9%  70.7%    69.7%  66.9%  105%  -0.7% 
Hungary  17.4%  19.0%    17.1%  18.1%  92%  18.3% 
India  23.6%  20.4%    17.1%  21.3%  116%  23.4% 
Indonesia  13.2%  13.2%    12.1%  13.7%  100%  15.6% 
Israel  17.6%  30.8%    22.8%  32.6%  57%  -0.3% 
Korea, Rep.  27.1%  19.4%    26.8%  19.9%  140%  41.9% 
Latvia  21.2%  16.0%    14.9%  15.2%  133%  16.1% 
Lithuania  20.1%  19.1%    14.9%  17.6%  106%  14.3% 
Malaysia  56.4%  32.8%    54.2%  33.5%  172%  7.2% 
Mexico  9.8%  11.5%    9.6%  11.2%  85%  17.6% 
Pakistan  11.0%  12.4%    10.0%  12.3%  89%  31.9% 
Peru  25.5%  16.9%    17.9%  16.6%  151%  2.4% 
Philippines  23.4%  19.2%    18.7%  18.9%  122%  17.7% 
Poland  15.6%  12.7%    14.1%  11.9%  123%  14.6% 
Russian Federation  36.9%  11.8%    23.8%  10.3%  314%  10.0% 
Singapore  101.0%  30.4%    99.1%  29.6%  333%  2.7% 
Slovak Republic  25.3%  14.1%    33.4%  14.4%  180%  3.6% 
South Africa  11.9%  12.1%    8.6%  11.3%  98%  44.3% 
Thailand  35.6%  14.9%    29.4%  15.6%  239%  16.3% 
Turkey  11.6%  12.0%    14.5%  12.7%  97%  30.3% 
Venezuela, RB  14.8%  10.1%    21.3%  8.4%  147%  0.3% 
Australia  3.3%  7.1%  11.3%  5.9%  6.3%  46%  29.2% 
Canada  3.1%  10.5%  11.2%  3.0%  10.6%  30%  19.6% 
Denmark  11.1%  9.5%  16.4%  13.1%  8.8%  118%  14.7% 
Iceland  13.5%  4.5%  10.0%  6.8%  4.5%  303%  113.9% 
Japan  22.2%  5.6%  4.7%  18.7%  5.7%  395%  -12.7% 
New Zealand  13.3%  12.3%  18.4%  8.2%  11.5%  108%  29.9% 
Sweden  7.0%  7.0%  12.5%  7.0%  6.6%  100%  22.4% 
Switzerland  18.1%  14.0%  20.0%  15.7%  13.9%  130%  3.6% 
United Kingdom  2.1%  15.6%  21.9%  2.0%  14.3%  13%  25.9% 
United States  2.0%  2.8%  1.9%  1.5%  2.6%  73%  0.0% 
Source: WDI data and authors’ calculations. Column 6, actual reserves to predicted reserves uses column 2, 
the predicted reserves based on column 5 of table 1 for both the advanced and emerging countries. Using 
the higher estimate for reserves needs for AD countries strengthens the results in table 2b. 